Singer on how we (do not) have dignity as humans
Peter Singer is always an interesting read. Just when you think "no one would actually say that!" well...he does. Today's op-ed in the New York Times (found at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/opinion/26singer.html) is a perfect example. Singer comments on the controversial case of Ashley, a severely mentally-disabled girl, whose parents had her body modified with surgery and hormones so that she could never grow any bigger and therefore live easier and simplify her care. Not only is this story worth pondering at length for its own ethical questions and merits, but, Singer's last two paragraphs are fascinating. They are as follows:
"Here’s where things get philosophically interesting. We are always ready to find dignity in human beings, including those whose mental age will never exceed that of an infant, but we don’t attribute dignity to dogs or cats, though they clearly operate at a more advanced mental level than human infants. Just making that comparison provokes outrage in some quarters. But why should dignity always go together with species membership, no matter what the characteristics of the individual may be?
"What matters in Ashley’s life is that she should not suffer, and that she should be able to enjoy whatever she is capable of enjoying. Beyond that, she is precious not so much for what she is, but because her parents and siblings love her and care about her. Lofty talk about human dignity should not stand in the way of children like her getting the treatment that is best both for them and their families."
Amazingly, he argues that human beings by virtue of being human have NO inherent value or dignity. You might rationally view a dolphin as having more value than a small child because they are more intelligent and a cheetah as having more dignity than a person in a wheelchair because of their swift, graceful, and agile bodies. This makes sense because value and dignity for Singer are based exclusively on mental and physical abilities. (Never mind for now that this is subjective and changeable.)
His next and final paragraph makes it clear that even this value is true only because we as a society have decided these are the things that merit value. Anyone or anything living outside of these characteristics - strong in mental and physical health - is not valuable in itself, but only if society or part of society choose to value it. Hence, in Ashley's case, since she is clearly outside the perimeter of the definition of something that inherently demands respect, care, and value, if her parents and siblings were to stop simply loving and caring for her, it would be rational to assume that she would flatly cease to have any value at all.
If I were less cynical I would find this shocking; as it is I simply find it incredibly sad.
"Here’s where things get philosophically interesting. We are always ready to find dignity in human beings, including those whose mental age will never exceed that of an infant, but we don’t attribute dignity to dogs or cats, though they clearly operate at a more advanced mental level than human infants. Just making that comparison provokes outrage in some quarters. But why should dignity always go together with species membership, no matter what the characteristics of the individual may be?
"What matters in Ashley’s life is that she should not suffer, and that she should be able to enjoy whatever she is capable of enjoying. Beyond that, she is precious not so much for what she is, but because her parents and siblings love her and care about her. Lofty talk about human dignity should not stand in the way of children like her getting the treatment that is best both for them and their families."
Amazingly, he argues that human beings by virtue of being human have NO inherent value or dignity. You might rationally view a dolphin as having more value than a small child because they are more intelligent and a cheetah as having more dignity than a person in a wheelchair because of their swift, graceful, and agile bodies. This makes sense because value and dignity for Singer are based exclusively on mental and physical abilities. (Never mind for now that this is subjective and changeable.)
His next and final paragraph makes it clear that even this value is true only because we as a society have decided these are the things that merit value. Anyone or anything living outside of these characteristics - strong in mental and physical health - is not valuable in itself, but only if society or part of society choose to value it. Hence, in Ashley's case, since she is clearly outside the perimeter of the definition of something that inherently demands respect, care, and value, if her parents and siblings were to stop simply loving and caring for her, it would be rational to assume that she would flatly cease to have any value at all.
If I were less cynical I would find this shocking; as it is I simply find it incredibly sad.
posted by Speaking of Life... at 8:58 PM
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